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Abstract
The integration of immigrants and their children is a burning issue in France.
Governments build a large part of their assimilation policies on the labor mar-
ket. The public sector is reputed to better assimilate minorities because of its
entrance exams and pay-scales. In this paper, a comparison of the public and
private sectors shows that second-generation immigrants are not treated equally.
However, the wage gap is determined by the number and gender of immigrant
parents and not by the country of origin.
JEL Codes: C35, J31, J45, J71
Keywords: Discrimination, wage gap, public-private sectors, France
Résumé
L’intégration des immigrés et de leurs enfants est un sujet important en France.
Les différents gouvernements successifs ont principalement construit leurs poli-
tiques d’assimilation sur le marché du travail et l’éducation. Le secteur public
est réputé mieux intégrer les minorités en raison des concours d’entrée et des
grilles salairales. Dans cet article, une comparaison des secteurs publics et privés
montre que les immigrés de seconde génération ne sont pas traités de manière
égale. Cependant, le différentiel de salaire est déterminé par le nombre et le
sexe des parents de l’immigrés et non par le pays d’origine.
Mots clés : Discrimination, différentiels de salaire, secteurs public/privé,
France
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1 Introduction
France is traditionally a country of immigration, partly due to its colonial his-
tory. The children of immigrants acquire French nationality by birth but real
problems in the assimilation of this population are clearly visible, as the events
of November 2005 have shown. Riots in the suburbs of big cities and particularly
Paris, where many immigrants and their children live, showed up the assimi-
lation issues in French society. Since this period, governments have tried to
introduce policies to improve assimilation into the school system and the labor
market. An administrative authority (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Dis-
criminations) has been created to encourage equality between citizens and fight
discrimination and some evidence has been collected of discrimination against
workers of foreign origin in companies’ hiring processes (see notably Duguet
et al. (2010)).
In economics, discrimination can be defined as differential treatment between
two persons, whose productive characteristics are similar. In the labor market,
three main forms are observable. The first appears in the hiring process, the
second concerns occupations in the firm and the last is the wage gap between
the reference population and the minority. Theoretically, Becker (1957) intro-
duced discrimination in the economic field and for the first time this is studied
from an economic point of view. Discrimination is assumed to be due to a
taste of individuals (employer, worker and consumer) which leads to a higher
cost of minority-workers for the employers. This discrimination should disap-
pear with competition and time because it depends on profits. A second wave
of theories comes from Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972). In order to model a
persistent discrimination, they introduced the concept of statistical discrimina-
tion: discrimination is rational in a context of imperfect information due to the
ignorance about the average productivity of minority groups. However, discrim-
ination tends to disappear by a learning phenomenon of employers or because
of self-fulfilling of a lower productivity by minorities. In both cases, imper-
fect competition is necessary to perpetuate discrimination. Studies1 show that
a negative correlation between competition and discrimination in the private
1See Heywood & Peoples (1994), Ashenfelter & Hannan (1986), Black & Strahan (2001)
and Black & Brainerd (2004)
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sector exists. Nevertheless, the impact of competition in the public sector is
not clear. An opposition between a competitive private sector and a non com-
petitive public sector intuitively drive to a lower wage gap between majority
and minority in the private sector. However, the public sector does not aim at
maximizing its profit and competition may have no impact on wages. Existing
empirical studies give different results by country and method of estimation.
Johnson (1978) found a lower wage gap between Black and White workers in
the public sector in the United-States whereas Shackett & Trapani (1987) did
not observe differences between both sectors. In order to study the impact of
competition on these sectors, Jolliffe & Campos (2005) focused on the economic
liberalization in Hungary after the URSS fall. The gender gap decreases dra-
matically after 1990. The authors put their results into perspective by the fact
that public owned firms are large on average in Hungary and in their sample,
the gender gap diminishes in all the large firms.
Nevertheless, there is a rich literature on the comparison of wages between
the private and public sectors. Empirical studies usually use wage-decomposition
à la Blinder-Oaxaca to identify a public sector premium. But there are many
criticisms concerning the choice of independent variables and the specification
of the model, which impact the estimates of discrimination. Recent literature
estimates switching regression models in order to correct for bias due to the
likelihood to work in a specific sector. Indeed it is highly likely that selection
between the two sectors is non-random due to different characteristics (for in-
stance Dustman & Van Soest (1998) for Germany, Hartog & Oosterbeek (1993)
and Van Ophem (1993) for the Netherlands, Van der Gaag & Vijverberg (1988)
for Ivory Coast, Fougère & Pouget (2003b) for France and Heitmueller (2006)
for Scotland). The conclusions are very dependent on national characteristics.
This study combines all these methods to highlight second-generation immi-
grants’ situation in France.
Only four papers deal with this subject in France: Bargain & Melly (2008),
Beffy & Kamionka (2010), Fougère & Pouget (2003b) and Meurs & Edon (2007).
Bargain & Melly (2008) use quantile regressions on panel data to measure the
wage gap between both sectors. They find that after controlling for unob-
served heterogeneity, only small pay differences between sectors remain. Beffy
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& Kamionka (2010) use a job search model and their estimation takes into ac-
count selectivity and sector choice biases. The results show that a large public
sector pay premium exists for women and for low wages, whereas men of the
public sector would earn more in the private sector. Fougère & Pouget (2003b)
aim to replicate the characteristics of the French public sector in their model
by a tree of choices and try to identify the main determinants of entry into the
public sector. The article by Meurs & Edon (2007) focuses on the comparison of
public premium across regions. They find that, in spite of the recent devolution
of power, the average wage gap does not differ widely throughout the country.
The papers in the recent literature, which focus on the comparison of discrim-
ination against minorities in the public and private sectors, essentially concern
gender issues. Ethnicity and race are subject to studies mainly in the United
Kingdom and in the United States (see Gregory & Borland (1999) p.3616).
In France, the public sector is renowned for more equity in wages and hiring,
notably concerning gender. The pay differences between men and women are
obviously lower in the public sector than in the private one. Studying discrim-
ination against another minority in both sectors can illuminate debates on the
fairness of the public sector.
Concerning second-generation immigrants, monographs have been written
on wage discrimination and the topic is relatively recent. In France, this subject
is essentially treated by sociologists due to the lack of census data. Indeed, the
law forbids the collecting of data on ethnicity and INSEE, the French National
Institute of Statistics, introduced questions about the nationality and the place
of birth of parents in their interviews or questionnaires only in 2005. Three
recent studies, Aeberhardt et al. (2010), Aeberhardt & Pouget (2007) and Meurs
& Pailhé (2010), study the gap between the mean wage of the second-generation
immigrants and their French counterpart in France. The former uses a new
econometric method to conclude that one third of the wage gap between ’French
natives’ (both of whose parents were born in France) and ’African natives’ (both
of whose parents were born in an African country) is not explained by differences
in observable covariates between the two groups. Then, Aeberhardt & Pouget
(2007) conclude that occupational segregation rather than wage discrimination
can be observed. Meurs & Pailhé (2010) focus on the likelihood to be employed
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for the immigrants descents and, particularly, on the case of women. They
compare second generation immigrants from Southern Europe and from North
Africa and find than the latter have lower probability to be employed, and
women cumulate this with the disadvantages of women in the French labor
market. In addition, Belzil & Poinas (2010) estimate a flexible dynamic model
of education choices and early career employment outcomes. Their study focuses
on people of African origin and shows that schooling attainments explain mainly
the differences in access to early career employment stability for this population.
The parental background differences explain it to a lesser extent. The differences
between French natives and second-generation immigrants in the labor market
are partly due to education.
The aim of this paper is to compare discrimination against the second gen-
eration immigrants in the public to the case of the private sector, to enhance
the theoretical intuition about discrimination and both sectors. No discrimi-
nation by origin is pointed out in both sectors. However, the comparison of
two different origins highlights the importance of parents’ nationality in labor
outcomes. To have a foreign mother decreases wage, as the nationality of the
father is more neutral. In order to take into account a non-random distribution
of workers in both sectors, a switching model is estimated. Then, the effect of
parents is reinforced and results show a larger impact in the private sector than
in the public sector.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the main
characteristics of the French public sector. Data are presented in Section 3 and
results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The French public sector
The French public sector is break down in three subsectors: central administra-
tion (51.3% in 2002), local government (29.6%) and public health(18.9%). Each
subsector has the same hiring process and wage scale and they employ almost
one fourth of the working population. 94.8% are public servants and workers
with a fixed term contract, 5.6% are subsidized jobs, which are excluded of the
study. On the one hand, civil servants are enrolled by a nationwide competi-
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tive examination for which a given level of education is required. They have a
lifetime contract and promotion is based on seniority or by internal competitive
examinations. They cannot be laid off except for misconduct. On the other
hand, workers with a fixed term contract are hired by interview like in the pri-
vate sector. Their contract could last until three years and could be renewed.
They represents 17.8% of the public sector employees in 2002. In both cases,
wages are set up by a national wage scale. However, during the 2000s, a larger
autonomy was given to the local authorities in hiring and human resources man-
agement. For a more detailed description of public sector wages, see Meurs &
Edon (2007).
A description of the French public sector has been made by Pouget (2005).
He points out differences between public and private sectors. As in this sample,
he notes that the skills structure varies across them. The public sector hires more
managers, intermediate professionals and white-collar than blue-collar workers,
who are more employed by the private sector. Moreover, in the public sector,
workers are often over-qualified compared to the level required. This is partly
due to the increase in unemployment in the eighties. Indeed, civil servants have
a job for life. As Krueger (1988) and, in the French case, Fougère & Pouget
(2003b) have observed, the application rate for government jobs increases as
the ratio of public to private sector earnings increases or as unemployment rate
rises. Consequently, the average quality of applicants in the public sector rises
with the number of applicants. Public sector employment seems to attract more
women because of its stability but they are often employed in low level or in
part time jobs: the public sector is predominantly female apart from manager
functions. Moreover, workers in the public sector are older than those in the
private sector. Several explanations could be given: first, government budget
constraint currently lead the state to hire fewer civil servants to reduce the
number of workers in the public sector. As the state offers lifetime employment
and then keeps workers whatever their age, the number of older workers is
higher. Second, as workers are better qualified in the public sector they arrive
later onto the labor market.
Concerning the diversity of the national origin of workers, South European
or African natives are under-represented in the public sector. This has been
7
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emphasized by Pouget (2005). He distinguishes workers with one immigrant
parent from those with two immigrant parents. The latter are more under-
represented in the public sector and, as North African natives tend to have
their both immigrant parents, their proportion in this sector is small. There is
a tendency for immigrants’ children to have a lower probability of finding a job
in the public sector than French natives, even when they have the same age,
qualifications and an equivalent father’s profession. These points are addressed
in the following sections.
3 Data
The aim of this study is to observe a potential wage gap between natives and sec-
ond generation immigrants. Several data bases are available to treat this topic
but only the French Labor Force Survey is representative of population, gives
information on productivity variables and origin and is a large enough sample
to obtain significant results. Data are drawn from the French LFS (Enquête
Emploi en Continu) collected by the French National Institute of Statistics, IN-
SEE. Each quarter, around 45,000 households are interviewed, which represents
roughly 70,000 individuals. All members of a household can be interviewed and
carry the same weight in the sample. Only 1/6 of the sample is new each quar-
ter and each household is interviewed six times in order to measure quarterly
changes. This survey contains information about education level, occupation,
wage, region, industry, employment status, social background and sector of em-
ployment.
Individuals’ origin appears only in the most recent versions through ques-
tions about parents’ nationality. This is why only data from 2005 to 2010
are used in this paper. Individuals are considered as French second-generation
immigrants when they possess French nationality and at least one parent has
another nationality. Immigrants from Southern Europe and Maghreb constitute
the largest minorities in France and their assimilation into the labor market is
very different. Most studies on this subject compare them to find out why
the North African immigrants are less assimilated in France than the South
European (e.g. Domingues Dos Santos (2005)). Their children represent 72%
8
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of French second-generation immigrants in this sample. Thereafter a ’North
African native’ represents a French national with at least one parent who has
a North African nationality at birth and is born in these countries. The same
vocabulary is used for South European origin. The distinction between an indi-
vidual with one or two immigrant parents is important. The sample allows us
to introduce a dummy for the gender of the non-French parent in regressions.
As we can see in descriptive statistics, North African natives are more likely to
have both migrant parents while those of South European origin have the same
probability to have only one or both non-French parents. Studies cited previ-
ously underline differences between mixed and non-mixed couples on children
outcomes. Regressions take into account the gender of the non-French parent
in order to observe if one parent has more influence on its child’s later earnings
than the other.
The regressions are based on a sample composed of individuals aged between
16 and 60, who are neither in education nor in retirement. The survey contains
workers in both the private and public sectors. Self-employed workers are omit-
ted because this article focuses on wages. Hourly wages are estimated in the
following section and are calculated using the weekly hours of a ‘’normal’ week.
These wages are net of contributions but not of tax assessment. As the question
on wages is only asked in the first and last interviews, data hold only the first
declared wage per person during the sample period. However, this information
is self-reported and subject to measurement errors, especially for professions
with flexible working hours such as managers. It would not be an issue for the
measurement of the wage gap between French natives and foreign natives as
the measurement error should be the same in both groups. Monthly wages are
estimated in robustness checks. Finally, hourly wages are assessed in Euros at
2005 prices.
After reducing the sample, it contains 87,251 French workers and around
11% are of foreign origin. The statistics in Table 1 show that they are more
educated and skilled but also older than the French average. The first significant
group comes from Southern Europe and accounts for 5.7% of the sample. This
wave of immigration mainly came in France between the 1930s and 1960s. The
second generation, now French, is lower skilled than the French average and
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by origin and sector in percentages
Origin France S. Europe Maghreb
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
# observations 57,207 22,786 3,813 1,179 1,737 529
Hourly wage (Euro) 10.41 11.73 10.21 11.44 9.36 10.08
(4.35) (4.91) (4.04) (4.88) (3.45) (3.94)
Immigrant parents
Father only - - 30 35 21 21
Mother only - - 15 20 6 8
Both - - 5 45 73 71
Age
less than 25 9 5 9 3 16 8
25 to 45 55 52 60 51 72 74
45 to 60 36 44 32 45 13 18
Female 14 64 11 65 11 63
Education
Graduates 10 20 7 19 9 21
University first degree 15 18 12 16 14 14
High school 18 19 17 17 22 19
Vocational training 32 23 4 27 26 22
Secondary education 25 2 27 21 29 24
Length of time in the job 134 191 123 185 69 101
# employees
less than 50 92 94 90 92 87 89
more than 50 8 6 10 8 13 11
Professional occupation
Manager 12 15 9 13 8 11
Intermediate 26 35 25 33 23 31
White-collar 30 43 33 47 37 51
Blue-collar 33 7 33 7 32 7
Fixed term contract 5 9 5 9 9 18
Work duration 0 0 0 0 0 0
Part time 16 19 16 18 16 17
Living area
Ile-de-France 12 13 18 17 29 30
Ile-de-France periphery 24 23 15 13 11 16
North 9 9 4 3 8 10
East 10 9 12 10 11 8
West 16 15 3 4 3 5
South East 10 11 13 13 6 4
Centre 9 10 16 14 15 14
South West 8 10 17 25 17 13
ZUS (Sensitive Urban Area) 4 4 6 5 19 19
(1) Private sector (2) Public sector. Wages are in Euros and tenure in months.
Source: Enquête Emploi en Continu survey, INSEE, Paris, 2006.
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they are more likely to work in the private sector. The second group comes from
Maghreb and they account for 2.6% of the sample. This wave of immigration
is more recent and is made up of Algerian, for the bigger part, Tunisian and
Moroccan. Their parents arrived at the time of decolonization or later from
ex-colonies in Northern Africa. French was a compulsory subject at school and
most of them speak French. Africa is now the biggest source of immigrants in
France. This group is younger and has more children. More than 30% live in
Paris and its suburbs and another 30% in other big cities. They work more in
the private than in the public sector.
The public sector includes state, local government and public hospital em-
ployees and it represents 28% of the working population. The private sector in-
cludes private firms, non-profit associations publicly-owned and national firms.
National publicly-owned firms represent 24% of the private sector and have
been added because of their profit maximization management. Indeed, the way
of management is relatively similar to the private sector and classical theory
of discrimination applies. The public sector is slightly over-represented as it
represented only 21% of the working population in France on December 31st,
2006. 49% of this population worked at state level, 32% for the local public
sector and 19% in public hospitals. The sample seems to be representative as
the figures are 49%, 34% and 17% for each public subsector, respectively. In our
sample, only 12% of workers of the public sector are not civil servants, which is
representative of French natives too. Concerning South European natives, 14%
of them have a fixed term contract, whereas this is the case for 19% of African
natives. These figures are relatively similar to the description of Pouget (2005).
4 Methods and results
Empirical evidence of differences in treatment toward workers because of non-
productive characteristics, such as physical criteria for instance, is established
through several methods. The more usual is to evaluate the wage gap between
the population which can be discriminated against and the witness popula-
tion. Here the witness population is the French natives and the potentially
discriminated-against population is made up of the other natives. As all indi-
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viduals are not spread identically between both sectors, an estimation of the
probability of working in each sector is necessary to correct the induced bias.
First, the wage gap is evaluated at different levels, and second, attention is fo-
cused on selection issues. Then a switching model is estimated in order to take
this bias into account in the wage-equation.
4.1 Wage gap
In order to measure the wage gap due to individuals’ origin, a wage-equation is
estimated. The explanatory variables comprise a dummy controlling for origin
and all variables are interacted with a sector dummy in order to identify a differ-
ential due to origin in both sectors. Thereby, it is possible to take into account
separately the effects of origin in each sector and to compare the coefficients.
Let wi be the log hourly wage. The log wage-equation to be estimated is:
ln(wi) = pubi.(X
′
i β + origi βo) + ui (1)
where X is the vector of characteristics, pub a dummy variable for the public
sector, u an error term and i is an individual index.
Each estimation is controlled for position attributes such as qualification,
working time (full-time versus part-time), tenure and employment contract. As
the public sector is made up of three different categories (state, hospital and
local government), which have different wage policies, a dummy controlled for
each type of public employment. Concerning individual characteristics, age
(quadratic function), education, gender and housing location are added in the
regression. Moreover, having only one parent has a lower impact on labor out-
comes. The second regression uses a variable related to the number of immigrant
parents. In order to verify if both parents have the same effect on wages, a vari-
able concerning which parent does not have the French nationality is used as an
alternative to the country of origin. The reference group is the French natives
working in the private sector.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the estimation of log wage-equation when
a dummy controlling for the sector (public or private) is interacted with all the
12
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Table 2: Public and private sector log wage-equation
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
*public *public *public
Public 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Origin
France - - - - - -
S. Europe 0.01* -0.01 0.01* -0.03**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.01)
Mother 0.004 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
Father 0.01** -0.03**
(0.008) (0.01)
Both parents -0.01 0.04** -0.02 0.06**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Maghreb -0.02*** 0.001 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.013) (0.01) (0.02)
Mother -0.01 0.001
(0.02) (0.05)
Father -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.03)
Both parents -0.01 -0.01 0.001 -0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.029) (0.06)
Constant 2.4*** 2.4*** 2.4***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 87,251 87,251 87,251
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This estimation is
controlled for public sector category, qualification, working time, tenure, employment
contract, age (linear and quadratic), education, gender, housing location and years.
variables of the equation. The first estimation, noted (1) in the table, uses a
dummy controlling for the country of origin. A difference of 0.04 is observable
between log wages in favor of the public sector. This coefficient is not significant
and conforms to the literature on France, where no uniform results exist on a
premium in favor of one sector. However, this premium depends on categories
of workers. Looking for the origin of workers, North African natives earn 2%
less than French natives and, on the contrary, South European natives receive
1% more than the reference population. The difference between both sectors
is not significantly different from zero. The presence of a pay-difference in the
public sector seems astonishing because of wage scales. But the coefficient takes
13
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into account all the variables of the regressions. It means that between a foreign
native with all the same controlled characteristics than as a French native, a
difference of x% is observable on average. For instance, the fact that North
African natives are, on average, more in a fixed term contract contributes to
this differential.
A simple dummy on origin shows a wage gap with French natives. However,
having only one foreign parent changes labor market outcomes, compared to
individuals with both foreign parents, and studies show that no significant gap
with French natives is observable when one parent has French nationality. Col-
umn (2) does not confirm this assertion. North African natives have no more
any wage gap with French natives. However, the wage gap in favor of South
European natives persists in the private sector without any impact of the num-
ber of foreign parents and a significant difference appears between French and
South European natives in the public sector. Having a South European parent
induces a gap of 3% between the private and the public sector. However, hav-
ing both South European parents increases wages by 4% in the public sector in
comparison with the private sector.
Brugeilles & Sebille (2009) study the French behavior of households concern-
ing children education. They show that the mother takes care alone of children
homework in more than 60% cases and shares it with the father in 30% cases, in
France in 2005. She is predominant in the scholar education of children. This
study can explain that a relationship exists between abilities at work and an
education with foreign habits. Indeed, consequences on language and behav-
ior can be observed, which could induce a lower wage. However, father gives
its name to its children, which is a clear indicator of origin for employers and
could induce discrimination. When a dummy on the non-French parents re-
places the country of origin in the regression, column (3) shows that previous
results are due to the father’s nationality in both sectors. As results are similar
in columns (2) and (3), the specification used afterwards only take into account
for mixed/non-mixed couples.
Table 3 summarizes results when the sample only contains second generation
immigrants, in order to compare both origins. Results are similar to the previous
one. It is worth to notice that a significant wage gap exists between South
14
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European and North African natives in the private sector. Coefficient is no
more significant in the third column, but it is certainly due to the small number
of observation by cells.
Table 3: Public and private sector log wage-equation of second generation im-
migrants
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
*public *public *public
Public 0.08 0.08 0.09
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Origin
S.Europe - - - - - -
Mother only
Father only 0.01 -0.002
(0.01) (0.02)
Both parents -0.01 0.04** -0.01 0.04*
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Maghreb -0.02*** 0.01 -0.02* 0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Mother only -0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.05)
Father only -0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.03)
Both parents -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.05
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Constant 2.31*** 2.31*** 2.31***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 7,267 7,267 7,267
R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.47
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This estimation is
controlled for public sector category, qualification, working time, tenure, employment
contract, age (linear and quadratic), education, gender, housing location and years.
In order to observe a particular effect of origin on the other variables, the
dummies of origin and sector are interacted with all the other explanatory vari-
ables. Table 4 sums up the results. The coefficients of individual characteristics
may depend on origin in that certain institutions may tend to equalize wages
between the origins and thus act to offset the discriminatory impact of the term
of origin. Allowing returns to vary by origin leads to higher gaps between French
natives and North African natives in the public sector as a wage gap of 0.40 in
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Table 4: Public and private sector log wage-equations by origin.
(1) (2)
Private sector Public sector
*S.Europe *Maghreb *S.Europe *Maghreb
Origin -0.11 -0.09 0.10 -0.40*
(0.07) (0.11) (0.15) (0.22)
Non-mixed -0.004 -0.01 0.07** -0.04
couple (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.02*** 0.003 -0.0004 0.01*** -0.005 0.02*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.01) (0.002) (0.008) (0.01)
Age squared -0.02*** -0.003 -0.0004 -0.02*** 0.01 -0.03
*100 (0.001) (0.004) (0.01) (0.002) (0.01) (0.02)
Women -0.11*** -0.03** 0.03* -0.06*** -0.01 0.005
(0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.0175) (0.02)
Education
Graduate - - - - - -
University -0.05*** 0.02 -0.01 -0.08*** 0.05* 0.07*
1st degree (0.005) (0.02) (0.03) (0.006) (0.03) (0.04)
High school -0.12*** 0.002 -0.01 -0.16*** 0.06** 0.05
(0.005) (0.02) (0.03) (0.006) (0.03) (0.04)
Vocational -0.18*** -0.005 -0.01 -0.23*** 0.06** 0.04
training (0.005) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Secondary -0.22*** 0.01 0.01 -0.27*** 0.04 0.09**
education (0.005) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Occupation
Manager - - - - - -
Intermediate -0.29*** 0.06*** 0.01 -0.24*** -0.04 -0.04
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
White-collar -0.48*** 0.05*** 0.05** -0.43*** -0.06** 0.03
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05)
Blue-collar -0.47*** 0.06*** 0.07*** -0.47*** -0.01 -0.02
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Length of time 0.001*** 0.00002 0.0001 0.001*** -0.0004 -0.001*
in the Job (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Fixed term -0.06*** 0.02 0.03 -0.11*** 0.02 0.01
contract (0.005) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Part time -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01 0.004 0.02 -0.02
(0.003) (0.01) (0.02) (0.004) (0.02) (0.03)
More than -0.07*** 0.04** 0.03 -0.03*** -0.02 0.03
50 employees (0.004) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Pulic subsectors
Manager - - - - - -
Local public 0.004 0.01 0.02
sector (0.004) (0.07) (0.02)
Publics -0.04*** -0.04 -0.04
hospitals (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Constant 2.42*** 2.43***
(0.02) (0.03)
Observations 62,757 24,494
R-squared 0.495 0.555
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This estimation is controlled
for regions and years. 16
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favor of French natives is observed. On the contrary, this coefficient is positive
for South European natives, but not significant. In the private sector, this gap
remains negative and not significantly different from zero for foreign natives.
It is worth to notice that the constant does not represent a basic salary in our
case. The individual characteristics do not explain the wages of North African
natives as well as those of the French natives. This leads to a higher intercept
term. Moreover, roughly 30% of North African natives earn the minimum wage
compared to 14% of the French natives. The minimum wage form a mass point
at the beginning of the wage distribution and it decreases the fit of the wage-
decomposition by individual characteristics. This phenomenon under-estimate
the wage gap as wages cannot be lower than this minimum.
The variables of Table 4 give interesting information on the impact of indi-
vidual characteristics for the different groups. The gender gap increases in the
case of Southern European natives in the private sector whereas it decreases for
North African natives. The coefficient associated to age is significantly higher
for North African natives than French natives in the public sector. However,
tenure is negative, which suggest that discrimination could occur by a glass
ceiling effect or a low evolution of occupations. The returns on education are
similar whatever origin in the private sector. In the public sector, returns are
higher for South European natives whereas returns are only positive for highly
and low educated North African natives. Concerning occupations, second gener-
ation immigrant workers have a positive gap with French natives in the private
sector whereas coefficients are not significant in the public sector, except 6%
less for white-collars.
With a view to complete this study, the wage gap is decomposed in two com-
ponents by the Blinder-Oaxaca method: the first part results from differences in
observable characteristics of individuals and the second one cannot be explained
from the model and is often interpreted as resulting from discrimination.
¯ln(wC)− ¯ln(wT ) = (X¯C − X¯T )β∗ + [(βˆC − β∗)X¯C + (β∗ − βˆT )X¯T ] (2)
where β∗ is the hypothetical matrix of coefficients, C stands for the control
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group and T for the tested group. In each sector, a first estimation compares
French natives (C) and second generation immigrants (T ) and, then, each origin
is tested.
Table 5: Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions
Private sector Public sector
Wage Wage
gap Explained Unexplained gap Explained Unexplained
With F. natives
S.E. natives 0.01*** 0.02*** -0.01* 0.03*** 0.01 0.02*
[0.01;0.04] [-0.02;0.001] [-0.01;0.03] [0.002;0.04]
N.A. natives 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.014*** 0.001
[0.01;0.10] [0.001;0.02] [0.09;0.17] [-0.04;0.04]
With S.E. natives
N.A. natives 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.02** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.02
[0.05;0.07] [0.002;0.03] [0.06;0.12] [-0.01;0.05]
Table 5 reports the results of Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of wages. Al-
most all the wage gap is explained by differences in endowments between major-
ity and second generation immigrants. An unexplained wage gap of 1 percentage
point is observable between French and South European natives, in favor of the
last ones, in the private sector and a negative one of 2 percentage points in the
public sector. North African natives’ characteristics entirely explain the wage
gap with French natives in both sectors. The third line compares North African
and South European natives in order to observe any differences between both
groups. Three fourth of the wage differential is explained by differences in ob-
servable charactersistics in the private sector. However, the last fourth remains
unexplained. On the contrary, the wage gap in the public sector is entirely
explained by endowments.
4.2 Selection issue
Economic discrimination can be present upstream from earnings and particu-
larly during the hiring process. Workers have to choose between public and pri-
vate sectors. The hiring process is different and French natives and non-French
natives can be treated differently in the two sectors. This section describes this
bias and simply evaluates it. As can be observed, individuals apply in different
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ways if they want to work in the private or in the public sector. In the first case,
there is free entry, with matching between employers and applicants. In the sec-
ond case, a majority is hired by examination results and the remainder through
the market. Consequently we cannot consider that the assignment between both
sectors is random and a selection bias exists in the sector choice. The following
sector employment-equation (3) is introduced to confirm this assertion.
S∗i = B
′
i δ + origi δo + νi (3)
where S∗ is a latent variable, B the vector of characteristics, δo the coefficient
to be estimated and ν the error term for participation.
The latent variable is not observable and an index-function is used:
Si = 1 if S∗i > 0
Si = 0 if S∗i ≤ 0
where Si = 1 and Si = 0 indicate private sector employment and public sector
employment respectively. The error term of the sector selection equation is
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σν .
The explanatory variables are individual characteristics used in the wage
equation: age, education, gender, housing location. Moreover, a variable con-
cerning the individual’s expected wage gain from public employment is relevant
to the probability of working in the private or in the public sector. This vari-
able is the differential between the expected wage in the public sector and the
expected wage in the private sector, calculated in the first estimation of Sec-
tion 4.1 with the observable characteristics of each worker. It assumes that
individuals behave rationally by comparing the potential wage in both sectors
before deciding to work in one of them. The individual’s social background
completes the explanation of the probability of working in the private or in the
public sector. Social background characteristics are supposed to affect only the
sector selection and not wages. In the literature several variables are used as
the education attainment of the parents, the father’s socio-professional group,
19
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.59R (Version révisée)
the mother’s working status or the siblings (see Dustman & Van Soest (1998),
Hartog & Oosterbeek (1993)). In this study, the mother’s and the father’s socio-
professional groups are available and are sufficiently detailed to know if their job
is in the public or in the private sectors. The importance of the type of occupa-
tion is highlighted by Fougère & Pouget (2003a) in their study of the economic
determinants of the likelihood to work in the public sector. The father’s type
of occupation particularly influences the likelihood to work in the public sector.
Indeed, children of civil servants are over-represented in the public sector. Fur-
thermore, Pouget (2005) shows that children of civil servants are studying longer
than the average and the workers hired in the public sector are more qualified
than those of the private sector. Their knowledge of public sector mechanisms
gives them the opportunity to better prepare the exams. This last piece of infor-
mation is important and suggests it could be used to identify sector employment.
This variable is added into the probit equation and is compressed into four cat-
egories. The first one contains individuals clearly identified as civil servants’
children. The second one contains occupations mostly represented in the public
sector, as some education or health jobs. This is a different category as some
workers of the private sector cannot be identified in this category. The third
one brings together employees of the private sector whereas independent work-
ers and professions are in the fourth one. Beyond, parents’ socio-professional
categories are used in control (farmers, self-employed, intermediate professions,
white-collars, blue-collars, retired and non-working individuals).
As in the previous part, the first estimation uses the country of origin, the
second one the number of foreign parents and the last one interacts gender of
parents and country of origin. Results are summarized in Table 6. First, the
wage differential has a strong positive and significant impact on the likelihood
to work in the public sector. It bears out that the distribution of workers in
both sectors is not random. Characteristics of workers of the public sector are
better fitted with the method of remuneration in this sector. This observation
justifies the following part aiming at endogenizing this repartition. Second, the
type of job of parents has a significant impact on the probability to work in
one sector. In accordance with previous studies on the French public sector,
children of civil servant are more likely to work in it. Coefficients of ambiguous
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Table 6: Probability of working in the public sector
(1) (2) (3)
Origin
France - - -
Southern Europe -0.05** 0.13***
(0.02) (0.03)
Mother 0.16***
(0.05)
Father 0.12***
(0.04)
Both parents -0.35*** -0.49***
(0.04) (0.07)
Maghreb 0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.06)
Mother 0.11
(0.12)
Father -0.09
(0.07)
Both parents 0.12 0.06
(0.07) (0.15)
Father’s occupation
Public service - - -
Mostly public occupation 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Employee (private) -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Self-employed, professions -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Mother’s occupation
Public service - - -
Mostly public occupation -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Employee (private) -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Self-employed, professions -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Wage differential -5.22*** -5.29*** -5.29***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant -0.27** -0.26** -0.26**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 79,349 79,349 79,349
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
These estimations are controlled for age, education, gender, housing
location and years.
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jobs (professors, nurses...) are not significant. Furthermore, the effect is similar
concerning mother and father.
In estimation (1), South European natives have a lower probability of 2% to
work in the public sector. The coefficient associated to North African natives
is not significantly different from 0. Introducing a dummy for mixed couples,
(column (2)), shows that this result is heterogeneous: the likelihood of working
in the public sector for workers with both South European parents is lower by
14 percentage points than French natives. If one of her parents is French, this
gap is positive and is worth 5%. Column (3) shows that gender of the immigrant
parent has no significant influence on the choice of the sector.
To conclude, only South European natives have a higher likelihood to work
in the private sector. This effect is particularly strong when both parents are
immigrants. The effect of the wage differential in the probit equation leads to
estimate the wage gap taking selection into account.
4.3 Switching model
Previous section shows that assignment to a sector is not random and biases
wage estimation of Section 4.1. A model of endogenous switching regression
is adapted to this case as it takes into account the sector choice bias and the
simultaneity of wage equations and sector selection function. This model was
described by Lee (1978) and was applied to sector choice by Hartog & Ooster-
beek (1993). Individuals are sorted over different states by a switching equation.
In our case, they work in the public or in the private sector. The observed wage
rate depends on the worker’s status, i.e. we observe:
ln(w1i) = X
′
i β1 + origi β1o + u1i, (4)
ln(w2i) = X
′
i β2 + origi β2o + u2i, (5)
S∗i = γ(ln(w1i)− ln(w2i)) +B′i δ + origi δo + νi. (6)
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where S, wji, Xi, Bi, βj and δi are already defined in previous parts, j = 1
if individual i works in the public sector and j = 2 if she works in the private
sector. Thus we have a simultaneous equations model involving qualitative
limited dependent variables. Equation (6) is the switching function and takes
up the sector choice equation. Equations (4) and (5) are the sector specific wage
equations defined in the previous part. In order to identify γ, some variables
have to be excluded from the wage equation. Variables allow identifying the
switching coefficients are dummies on the nature (public or private) of parents’
occupations. As argued in previous section, these variables influence individual’s
choice of the sector of employment, but do not affect the wages. This link is
well documented in the French literature on the public sector and, in this study,
this variable is strongly correlated to sector choice. Moreover, wages are really
sensitive to parents’ occupations but only few related to their sector. Parents’
sector is not significant in wage equation and correlation with wages is less than
0.2.
As previous results show that using a dummy on mixed and non-mixed
couples is more pertinent, this part focuses on the number of immigrant parents.
Table 7 presents estimation results of the switching model. The first two columns
show the coefficients for wage equations and the third column contains the
estimates for the switching equation. This regression confirms the impact of
South European origin. Having both immigrant parents increases wage of the
private sector by 3 percentage points compared to French natives whereas only
one immigrant parent has only an impact in the public sector. In both cases,
the wage gap is in favor of second generation immigrants. This result shows that
the sector selection has an important role in wage gap between French natives
and others. Taking into account the selection process shows that a positive
differential exists between French natives and South European natives in both
sectors. On the contrary, North European origin has no significant effect on
wages whatever the sector. Concerning the impact of the family background on
the probability of working in a sector, it is worth to notice that identification
variables are significant, except ambiguous occupations, and consistent with
previous estimation of the probability to work in the public sector. The impact
of parents, whose occupation is self-employed, profession or inactivity is lower
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Table 7: Public and private sector log wage-equations and sector selection func-
tion
(1) (2) (3)
Public Private Selection
sector sector function
Origin
France - - -
Southern Europe -0.01 0.01*
(0.01) (0.001)
Both parents 0.03** 0.003
(0.01) (0.01)
Maghreb -0.0003 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Both parents 0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Father’s occupation
Public service -
Mostly public occupation 0.06*
(0.04)
Employee (private) -0.15***
(0.02)
Self-employed, professions -0.04***
(0.03)
Mother’s occupation
Public service -
Mostly public occupation -0.03
(0.03)
Employee (private) 0.15***
(0.02)
Self-employed, professions -0.06***
(0.04)
Constant 2.39*** 2.27*** -2.26***
(0.04) (0.02) (.10)
σ1 0.25***
σ2 0.28***
ρ1 -0.22***
ρ2 -0.63***
Observations 87,251
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wage equa-
tions are controlled for year, qualification, working time, employment con-
tract, age, education, gender and housing location. The selection equation
is controlled for parents’ occupations, qualification, age, education, gender,
housing location and years.
in this part but significantly negative. The dummy corresponding to a mother
employed in the private sector has a positive impact in the selection function.
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This result is surprising but could be explained by the introduction of wage-
equation variables in the sector choice-equation.
Correlations between wages and the sector selection equation is summarized
by coefficients ρi in the switching model. These correlations result from the
conditional expectations of the wages:
E(w1i|Si = 1,1i ) = X ′i β1 + origi β1o + σ1ρ1f(δBi)/F (δBi)
E(w1i|Si = 0,1i ) = X ′i β1 + origi β1o − σ1ρ1f(δBi)/(1− F (δBi))
E(w2i|Si = 1,1i ) = X ′i β2 + origi β2o + σ2ρ2f(δBi)/F (δBi)
E(w2i|Si = 0,1i ) = X ′i β2 + origi β2o − σ2ρ2f(δBi)/(1− F (δBi))
As ρ1 and ρ2 are both negative and significantly different from zero, workers of
each sector better perform in that sector than a random worker of the sample.
However, performance is higher for workers of the private sector than for workers
of the public sector. Consequently, the sector selection allocates workers to the
sector where their abilities will be better paid.
4.4 Robustness checks
As second generation immigrants and the public sector have particular charac-
teristics, several parameters could influence results. Following paragraphs tests
the robustness of the study among these parameters.
Young workers South European and North African immigration waves have
not the same characteristics. South European wave is older and second gener-
ation immigrants cover the entire population pyramid. On the contrary, North
African wave is more recent and began mostly after decolonization. Second-
generation immigrants are younger and only few of them are more than 45
years old. In order to better compare both origins, the study is redone only
with individuals less than 45. Results reinforce previous findings: an impact
of origin is observable for South European natives and nothing is significant
concerning North African natives. It is worth to notice one change: it adds a
significant negative impact of a North African father in the probability to work
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in the public sector.
Women Behavior of women is different from behavior of men. In particular,
women are over-represented in the public sector. It is often explained by the
fact that jobs of the public sector are mostly life job and that the gender gap
is lower in the public sector. Another bias could be due to the fact that gender
equity is not the same is all culture and a larger gender gap could be higher
among second generation immigrants among French natives. In order to check
all these hypothesis, equations are separately estimated for women and men.
Results are identical to previous regressions. Consequently, gender does not
influence our findings.
ZUS In order to decrease geographical inequalities, the French government
leads active policies. Several categories of areas have been defined: priority ed-
ucation zones (Zones d’Education Prioritaire), tax-free zones (Zones Franches
Urbaines) or sensitive urban zones (Zones Urbaine Sensible). In this study, the
last one could have an impact on wages and the likelihood to work in the pub-
lic sector. ZUS are defined in the law as areas characterized by large housing
estate or damaged hoods and imbalanced between employment and dwelling.
Inhabitants are facing economic hardships: a high unemployment rate, espe-
cially for young people, insecurity and low wages. Another characteristic is a
poor level of education. Due to high difficulties inside schools, the quality of
diploma delivered is lower than in the whole territory. Living in a ZUS could
be a signal of bad education for employers and controlling for it in estimations
can under-estimate the wage gap. Immigrant population is over-represented in
these areas and, consequently, the second generation too. In our sample, 18%
of the North African natives live in ZUS compared to 5% for French and South
European natives.
To control any changes due to this localization, a dummy on the ZUS is
introduced in regression equations. Results remains similar: The dummy does
not change significance of North African origin in wages equation nor in selec-
tion estimation. However, it decreases the wages of North African natives in
the private sector and is relatively neutral in other cases. This impact is added
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to the discrimination factor as Simon et al. (2000) show in their note. Indeed,
the immigrants from Africa tend to live more in social housing and not in pri-
vate apartments and the ZUS are essentially made up of social housing and
located in the suburbs. The hiring process is known as discriminating against
the second-generation African immigrants as shown Duguet et al. (2010) in
their correspondence study. And the difficulties of this minority on the housing
market decrease their wages as the coefficient associated to the variable ZUS
highlights.
Full time workers Our sample contains full and part time workers. Around
17% of workers have a part time contract. These workers have particular charac-
teristics and are often excluded from estimations of wage equations. Our results
are relatively similar when part time workers are omitted. The contrast be-
tween North African and South European natives is deeper in wage and sector
selection equations but the difference remains insignificant.
Monthly wages Some predominantly public jobs, as teacher, induce few re-
ported hours and more work at home. This could induce a bias in estimation
of public wages. An overlook on descriptive statistics shows that most of them
reported a full-time schedule of more than 40 hours and there are no differences
in declaration by origin and sector. To confirm these observations, the study is
redone with monthly wages on full-time workers. Results are similar concerning
North African natives and, even if coefficients are negative, the wage gap is not
significant. Concerning South European natives, results are no more significant
when the country of origin is interacted with parents’ gender. However, results
are similar in the public sector when origin is controlled by the country of origin
and a dummy on mixed/non-mixed couples.
5 Conclusion
Using the French Labor Force Survey, this paper provides an empirical evalu-
ation of discrimination against French second-generation immigrants. In order
to compare the public and the private sector, a wage-equation is estimated by
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sector. However the assignment between sectors is non-random and a switch-
ing model takes this bias into account by a simultaneous equations model with
limited dependent and qualitative endogenous variables.
Our study shows that all the second generation immigrants are not similarly
treated. If the entire wage gap between North African and French natives is
explained by productive characteristics of workers, a part of the wage gap in
favor of South European natives remains unexplained. This result confirms
that all foreign natives are not fully integrated to the French labor market. The
particular situation of the North African natives is pointed out in studies on the
second-generation immigrants in France, and compared to the South European
natives, who are better assimilated in the labor market. Several explanations
can be given. First, the educational attainment is really different, as Domingues
Dos Santos & Wolf (2007) show. Belzil & Poinas (2010) confirm this educational
gap between the African and the French natives and they conclude that this
affects the hiring process and the wages of the second-generation immigrants
into the labor market. Second, differences of behavior at work observed in
the different minorities in France, which is put forward by Senik & Verdier
(2011) justify differences on the labor market. Third, the importance of housing:
The fact that the African immigrants are mostly in social housing and in ZUS
decreases their probability to access to employment as correspondence studies
show. This paper shows that this has an impact on wages too. However, results
show that the number of immigrant parents and their gender is more important
to explain differences between foreign natives. than the country of origin to
explain wage gaps. Even if the coefficient associated to North African origin is
negative and the one associated to South European origin is positive, results are
not significant as in other studies on the topic. The mother plays a particular
role as she spends more time on children homework. This mirrors the issue of
education of immigrants’ children.
The other result of this paper is that, contrary to the reputation of fairness
enjoyed by the public sector, French second generation is not treated similarly
in both sectors. The wage gap between French and South European natives is
higher in the public sector than in the private one. The wage gap is observed
in the simple OLS wage-equation estimation and persists when controlling for
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the non-random assignment of individuals in the sectors.
Compared to hiring discrimination observed in France against North African
natives, we can consider that discrimination on wages does not exist. Further
research on this topic has to be focus on path in life in order to take into account
other forms of discrimination as hiring or occupation, and study pre-market
discrimination.
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Table 8: Public and private sector log wage-equations and sector selection function
(1) (2) (3)
Public Private Selection
sector sector function
Origin
Southern Europe
Mother -0.02 -0.002
(0.02) (0.01)
Father -0.01 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Both parents 0.05** -0.004
(0.02) (0.01)
Northern Africa
Mother -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03)
Father 0.003 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Both parents -0.02 -0.004
(0.05) (0.03)
Father’s occupation
Public service - - -
Mostly public occupation 0.06
(0.04)
Employee (private) -0.14***
(0.02)
Self-employed, professions -0.03***
(0.03)
Mother’s occupation
Public service - - -
Mostly public occupation -0.04
(0.03)
Employee (private) 0.15***
(0.02)
Self-employed, professions -0.05***
(.04)
Constant 2.38*** 2.27*** -2.21***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.10)
σ1 0.24***
σ2 0.28***
ρ1 -0.22***
ρ2 -0.64***
Observations 87,251
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wage equa-
tions are controlled for year, qualification, working time, employment con-
tract, age, education, gender and housing location. The selection equation is
controlled for qualification, age, education, gender and housing location.
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Table 9: Log wage-equation regression
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
*public *public *public
Public 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Southern Europe 0.01* -0.01 0.01* -0.03**
(0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother 0.004 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
Father 0.01** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01)
Both parents -0.01 0.04** -0.02 0.06**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Northern Africa -0.02*** 0.02 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Mother -0.01 0.001
(0.02) (0.05)
Father -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.03)
Both parents -0.01 -0.01 0.001 -0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Age 0.02*** -0.004** 0.02*** -0.004** 0.02*** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Age squared -0.02*** .001 -0.02*** 0.001 -0.0002*** 0.001
*100 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Women -0.12*** 0.05*** -0.12*** 0.05*** -0.12*** 0.05***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
University -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.05*** -0.02***
1st degree (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
High school -0.12*** -0.04*** -0.12*** -0.03*** -0.12*** -0.03***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Vocational -0.18*** -0.05*** -0.18*** -0.05*** -0.18*** -0.05***
training (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Secondary -0.22*** -0.05*** -0.22*** -0.046*** -0.22*** -0.05***
education (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Length of time 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.0003***
in the job (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0001)
Length squared -0.0001*** 0.00002 -0.0001*** 0.00002 -0.0001*** 0.00002
*100 (7.44e-06) (1.43e-05) (7.44e-06) (1.43e-05) (7.44e-06) (1.43e-05)
More than -0.07*** 0.047*** -0.07*** 0.047*** -0.07*** 0.047***
50 employees (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008)
Intermediate -0.29*** 0.04*** -0.29*** 0.04*** -0.29*** 0.04***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
White-collar -0.48*** 0.04*** -0.48*** 0.04*** -0.48*** 0.04***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
Blue-collar -0.47*** -0.003 -0.47*** -0.003 -0.47*** -0.003
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
Fixed term -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05***
contract (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Part time -0.02*** 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.03*** -0.02*** 0.03***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
34
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.59R (Version révisée)
Table 10: Log wage-equation regression(continuation)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
*public *public *public
Grande couronne -0.09*** 0.05*** -0.09*** 0.05*** -0.09*** 0.05***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
North -0.10*** 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.08***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
East -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.05*** 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.03***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
West -0.12*** 0.07*** -0.12*** 0.07*** -0.12*** 0.07***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
South east -0.11*** 0.07*** -0.11*** 0.071*** -0.11*** 0.07***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
Center -0.08*** 0.04*** -0.08*** 0.04*** -0.08*** 0.04***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
South west -0.08*** 0.05*** -0.08*** 0.05*** -0.08*** 0.05***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
2006 0.005 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.005 -0.01
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
2007 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.02*** -0.03***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
2008 0.02*** -0.04*** 0.02*** -0.04*** 0.02*** -0.04***
(0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
2009 0.01*** -0.03*** 0.01*** -0.03*** 0.01*** -0.03***
(0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
2010 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.02*** -0.03*** 0.02*** -0.03***
(0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02)
Hospital 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.04)
Local government -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 2.38*** 2.38*** 2.38***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 87,251 87,251 87,251
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Log wage-equation regression for 2nd generation immigrants
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
*public *public *public
Public 0.08 0.08 0.09
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
S.E Father 0.01 -0.002
(0.01) (0.02)
Both parents SE -0.01 0.04** -0.01 0.04*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Northern Africa -0.02*** 0.01 -0.02* 0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Mother -0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.05)
Father -0.02 0.05
(0.02) (0.03)
Both parents -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.05
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Age 0.02*** -0.003 0.02*** -0.004 0.02*** -0.004
(0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
Age squared -0.02*** -0.001 -0.02*** 0.0004 -0.02*** 0.0005
*100 (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
Women -0.13*** 0.06*** -0.13*** 0.05*** -0.13*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
University -0.04*** 0.02 -0.04*** 0.02 -0.04*** 0.02
1st degree (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
High school -0.12*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Vocational -0.18*** 0.01 -0.18*** 0.01 -0.18*** 0.01
training (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Secondary -0.21*** -0.01 -0.21*** -0.004 -0.21*** -0.004
education (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Length of time 0.001*** -0.0002 0.001*** -0.0002 0.001*** -0.0002
in the job (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Length squared -0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0001***
*100 (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0001)
More than -0.04*** 0.02 -0.04*** 0.02 -0.04*** 0.02
50 employees (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Intermediate -0.25*** -0.03 -0.25*** -0.04 -0.25*** -0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
White collar -0.43*** -0.03 -0.43*** -0.03 -0.43*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Blue-collar -0.42*** -0.07* -0.42*** -0.07* -0.42*** -0.07*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Fixed term -0.04*** -0.07** -0.04*** -0.07** -0.04*** -0.07**
contract (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
Part time -0.03*** 0.05** -0.03*** 0.05** -0.03*** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
36
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.59R (Version révisée)
Table 12: Log wage-equation regression for 2nd generation immigrants (contin-
uation)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(wage) ln(wage) ln(wage)
*public *public *public
Grande couronne -0.06*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
North -0.06*** 0.04 -0.06*** 0.04 -0.06*** 0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
East -0.03** 0.03 -0.03** 0.04 -0.03** 0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
West -0.08*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
South east -0.10*** 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.08*** -0.10*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Center -0.05*** 0.03 -0.05*** 0.03 -0.05*** 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
South west -0.07*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
2006 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
(0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
2007 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.005
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
2008 0.02* -0.03 0.02* -0.03 0.02* -0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
2009 0.004 -0.02 0.004 -0.02 0.004 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
2010 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Hospital 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Local government -0.07** -0.07** -0.08**
(0.03) (0.035) (0.035)
Constant 2.31*** 2.31*** 2.31***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 7,267 7,267 7,267
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Probability of working in the public sector
(1) (2) (3)
Southern Europe -0.05** 0.1***
(0.02) (0.03)
Mother 0.16***
(0.05)
Father 0.12***
(0.04)
Both parents -0.35*** -0.49***
(0.04) (0.07)
Northern Africa 0.05 -0.04
(0.03) (0.06)
Mother 0.11
(0.12)
Father -0.09
(0.07)
Both parents 0.12 0.06
(0.07) (0.15)
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Women 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
University -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30***
1st degree (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High school -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.35***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Vocational -0.48*** -0.48*** -0.48***
training (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Secondary -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.51***
education (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Grande couronne -0.28** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
North -0.43*** -0.44*** -0.44***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
East -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
West -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
South east -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.34***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Center -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.30***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
South west -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 14: Probability of working in the public sector
(1) (2) (3)
F - Mostly pub 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
F -private empl. -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.14***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
F - self-empl. -0.18*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
M - Mostly pub -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
M -private empl. -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
M - self-empl. -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.41***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
F - farmer -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
F- self-empl. -0.07 -0.06 -0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
F - intermediate -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
F - white-collar 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
F - blue-collar -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
F - retired -0.20* -0.20 -0.20*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
F - inactive 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
M - farmer 0.0 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
M- self-empl. -0.18* -0.18* -0.17*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
M - intermediate -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
M - white-collar -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
M - blue-collar -0.17 -0.17 -0.17
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
M - retired -0.39** -0.39** -0.39**
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
M - inactive -0.19* -0.19* -0.19*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Wage -5.22*** -5.29*** -5.29***
differential (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant -0.27** -0.26** -0.26**
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 79,349 79,349 79,349
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 15: Public and private sector log wage-equations and sector selection
function
(1) (2) (3)
Public Private Selection
sector sector function
Southern Europe -0.01 0.01** -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Both parents 0.0344** 0.003 -0.14***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Northern Africa -0.0005 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.06)
Both parents -0.02 -0.01 0.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.07)
Age 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Age squared -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
*100 (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Women -0.07*** -0.13*** 0.18***
(0.00400) (0.00262) (0.01)
University 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.57***
1st degree (0.01) (0.005) (0.02)
High school 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
Vocational -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.14***
training (0.005) (0.003) (0.01)
Secondary -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.12***
education (0.01) (0.003) (0.02)
Length of time 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.006***
in the job (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.0001)
Length squared -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.001***
*100 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00003)
More than -0.02** -0.06*** -0.23***
50 employees (0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
Intermediate -0.26*** -0.31*** 0.29***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
White collar -0.45*** -0.52*** 0.53***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
Blue-collar -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.38***
(0.01) (0.005) (0.02)
Fixed term -0.14*** -0.12*** 0.72***
contract (0.01) (0.005) (0.02)
Part time 0.01** -0.02*** -0.08***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.01)
Grande couronne -0.04*** -0.09*** 0.03**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.02)
North -0.02*** -0.10*** -0.003
(0.01) (0.005) (0.02)
East -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.01) (0.005) (0.02)
West -0.05*** -0.12*** 0.01
(0.006) (0.004) (0.02)
South east -0.04*** -0.12*** 0.08***
(0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
Center -0.03*** -0.07*** -0.04*
(0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
South west -0.03*** -0.09*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.005) (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wage equa-
tions are controlled for year, qualification, working time, employment con-
tract, age, education, gender and housing location. The selection equation
is controlled for parents’ occupations, qualification, age, education, gender,
housing location and years.
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Table 16: Public and private sector log wage-equations and sector selection
function (continuation)
(1) (2) (3)
Public Private Selection
sector sector function
2006 -0.01 0.002 0.03
(0.006) (0.004) (0.02)
2007 -0.002 0.02*** -0.03*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.02)
2008 -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.003
(0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
2009 -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.02
(0.005) (0.004) (0.02)
2010 -0.01** 0.02*** -0.03*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.02)
F - Mostly pub. 0.06*
(0.04)
F -private empl. -0.15***
(0.02)
F - self-empl., professions -0.04
(0.03)
M - Mostly pub. -0.03
(0.03)
M -private empl. 0.15***
(0.02)
M - self-empl., professions -0.0560
(0.04)
F - self-empl. 0.01
(0.0267)
F - professions 0.11***
(0.03)
F - intermediate 0.14***
(0.03)
F - white-collar 0.20***
(0.03)
F - blue-collar 0.12***
(0.03)
F - retired -0.03
(0.11)
F - inactive 0.17***
(0.05)
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wage equa-
tions are controlled for year, qualification, working time, employment con-
tract, age, education, gender and housing location. The selection equation
is controlled for parents’ occupations, qualification, age, education, gender,
housing location and years.
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Table 17: Public and private sector log wage-equations and sector selection
function (continuation)
(1) (2) (3)
Public Private Selection
sector sector function
M- self-empl. 0.02
(0.03)
M - professions 0.12**
(0.05)
M - intermediate 0.17***
(0.04)
M - white-collar 0.15***
(0.04)
M - blue-collar 0.15***
(0.04)
M - retired -0.12
(0.15)
M - inactive 0.13***
(0.04)
Constant 2.38*** 2.27*** -2.17***
(0.04) (0.0177) (0.101)
σ1 0.25***
σ2 0.28***
ρ1 -0.22***
ρ2 -0.63***
Observations 87,251 87,251 87,251
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Wage equa-
tions are controlled for year, qualification, working time, employment con-
tract, age, education, gender and housing location. The selection equation
is controlled for parents’ occupations, qualification, age, education, gender,
housing location and years.
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